This paper addresses four "stylized facts" that summarize data from experimental studies of voluntary contributions to provision of public goods. Theoretical propositions and testable hypotheses for voluntary contributions are derived from two models of social preferences, the inequity aversion model and the egocentric other-regarding preferences model. We …nd that the egocentric other-regarding preferences model with classical regularity properties can better account for the stylized facts than the inequity aversion model with non-classical properties.
INTRODUCTION
Americans gave more than $240 billion to charities in 2003 (Giving USA 2004 ) . Much of this charity is distributed as private goods to recipients who are anonymous to the contributors, and hence it is only the total amounts of categories of contributions that can generate utility to the contributors. But the same total amount can be contributed if you give more and I give less. In that way, charitable contributions are public goods.
Fundamental questions in public economics center on understanding the conditions under which public goods can be supplied through voluntary contributions -if perhaps not optimally then at least at signi…cantly positive levels. Development of this understanding requires both empirical and theoretical research.
Experiments with human subjects in simple laboratory environments provide one type of data that can guide theoretical modeling. A large literature reports the ways in which voluntary contributions to public goods vary with the treatment parameters that de…ne the simpli…ed experimental public economy. Some stylized facts about the properties of voluntary provision of public goods have emerged from these experiments. Theoretical modeling seeks to explain these stylized facts (and other relevant data).
It has long been accepted that traditional microeconomic and game theoretic models of selfregarding (or "economic man") preferences cannot rationalize data from public goods experiments (Ledyard 1995) . We ask whether two recent models of social preferences can rationalize the data.
We examine a model of inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt 1999) and a model of egocentric other-regarding preferences (Cox and Sadiraj 2003) .
Both of these models incorporate other-regarding preferences: if you and I participate in a voluntary contributions game then my utility varies with your material payo¤ as well as my own and your utility also varies with both my payo¤ and yours. In this way, both models generalize traditional economic man preferences to incorporate what were traditionally called "consumption externalities." But the two models of social preferences we consider have di¤erent relationships to two properties of classical preference theory (Hicks 1939 , Samuelson 1947 , strict convexity and strict positive monotonicity. Strict convexity is the traditional assumption that indi¤erence curves (or surfaces, for more than two variables) are strictly convex to the origin. Strict positive monotonicity is the traditional assumption that more is preferred to less. If social preferences are strictly monotonic then others' payo¤s as well as one's own payo¤ are always goods. The egocentric other-regarding preferences model incorporates both strict convexity and strict positive monotonicity. In contrast, the inequity aversion model has preferences that are not positively monotonic and not strictly convex (because the indi¤erence "curves" are piecewise linear). The inequity aversion model's inconsistency with positive monotonicity is fundamental: your material payo¤ is a good to me when it is less than my payo¤ but a bad when it is larger than my payo¤.
We use the egocentric other-regarding preferences model and inequity aversion model to address the question of rationalizing data with the patterns in four stylized facts from linear public good experiments. We …nd that the egocentric other-regarding preferences model with classical regularity properties can better account for the stylized facts than the inequity aversion model with nonclassical properties.
STYLIZED FACTS
Some of the data patterns that characterize voluntary contributions in experiments with linear public good games are described in the following stylized facts. 4. Endowment e¤ects in homogeneous environments: Environment homogeneity means that all subjects are given the same endowment and that the marginal monetary payo¤s are the same for everybody. With environment homogeneity, larger endowments have been found to elicit larger contributions in both one-shot treatments (Cherry, Kroll, and Shogren 2005) and in the last round of multi-round treatments (Andreoni 1988 (Andreoni , 1995a ). Ledyard (1995) concludes that (a) "hard-nosed" game theory cannot explain the data 2 and (b) altruism cannot explain the data. In contrast, altruistic models of public good games are reported to be empirically supported by Andreoni (1995a) , Anderson, Goeree and Holt (1998) , and Goeree, Holt and Laury (2002) .
PREVIOUS CONLUSIONS ABOUT THEORY
Studies that employ altruistic models to try to explain behavior in public good games are abundant in the literature. Andreoni (1989) introduces the "warm-glow" model of altruism. 3 Palfrey and Prisbrey (1997) implement an experimental design with constant marginal value of the public good and randomly-varying, individual-speci…c values of the private good intended to identify subjects' response functions. They reject altruism that is (assumed to be) linear and homogeneous across subjects in favor of a warm glow explanation that is allowed to vary across subjects.
Goeree, Holt, and Laury (2002) address the altruism vs. noise question with an experimental design that separately varies the "internal" return (of a subject's own monetary payo¤) and the "external" return (of other subjects' payo¤s) from a change in contributions to the public good.
They report that contributions increase with internal return, external return, and group size. Their data support the conclusion that individual choices are motivated by altruistic other-regarding preferences that respond to the external return and group size rather than warm-glow altruism. They …nd di¤erences in individual altruism coe¢ cients, that is heterogeneous other-regarding preferences.
They also report that a linear model of altruistic other-regarding preferences does not rationalize the data as well as a Cobb-Douglas (nonlinear) other-regarding preferences model. One of the two models discussed in the following section, the egocentric other-regarding preferences model, is a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) preference model that contains Cobb-Douglas preferences as a special case.
MODELS OF SOCIAL PREFERENCES
In this paper, we consider two models of other-regarding preferences, the egocentric altruism model In a voluntary contributions, linear public good game, n 2 players simultaneously choose the amounts they will contribute to a public good. Typically, each subject is given an endowment w and asked to choose an amount g i 2 [0; w] to invest in the public good. Investments in the public good yield the constant rate of return a 2 [1=n; 1); whereas the rate of return on investments in the private good equals 1. Thus the monetary payo¤ y i to subject i from participating in one period of a voluntary contributions public good experiment is
(1)
The inequity aversion model
The Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model is based on the assumption that agent i has preferences over her own payo¤ y i and n 1 others'payo¤s y j , j 6 = i; in which another's payo¤ is a good when it is less than one's own payo¤ and a bad when it is larger than one's own payo¤. For the special case n = 2; the utility function for agent 1 can be written as
where 1 1 and 0 1 1: Figure 1 shows typical indi¤erence "curves" for utility function (2) . The de…ning property of inequality (or "inequity") aversion is shown by the positive slopes of the indi¤erence curves above the forty-…ve degree line.
In general, inequity averse preferences can be represented by the family of utility functions:
where i i and 0 i < 1. This model has the following implications for the …nal period of a voluntary contributions public good game. Let G g 1 + g 2 + : : : + g n denote the total contribution to the public good. Then the utility u i (y(g i ; g i ))( i (g)) that agent i derives from a contribution
The following proposition is proved in appendix A.1. 
whereas the loss
; then by the assumption that i n 1 n 3 (1 a); individual i is better o¤. Since the assumption holds for all individuals, there is no individual who wants to be among the highest contributors and therefore there are no asymmetric equilibria. Figure 1 illustrates why there can be no asymmetric equilibria for the two-agent special case.
Let individual 1 invest more than individual 2 and the …nal payo¤ be A = (y 1 ; y 2 );where y 2 > y 1 :
As it can be seen from Figure Contributions implication. The experimental treatments reported in Table 1 have parameters that satisfy 1 n 1 n 3 (1 a). The inequity aversion model speci…es that i 1; for all i:
Therefore the assumption in Proposition 1, i n 1 n 3 (1 a); for all i; is satis…ed for the experimental treatments reported in Table 1 . Furthermore, 1 a 0:5 in all reported experiments. Hence if we reasonably assume that there is at least one individual with i < 0:5 then the inequity aversion model predicts contributions of 0 as a unique Nash equilibrium. 5 The data tell a di¤erent story.
In the Table 1 to the public good in the last round. Figure 2 shows the distribution of positive contributions in these experiments. On average, the last round contributions by positive contributors is forty-three percent of their endowments. 6 Furthermore, positive contributors are notably heterogenous; the range of positive contributions is from two percent to 100 percent of endowments.
Figures reported in the right-most column of Table 1 show percentages of subjects who make positive contributions in the last round in several experiments. Positive contributions in the last round, by eleven percent to …fty-seven percent of the subjects, cannot be explained by the inequity aversion model. We conclude that the inequity aversion model cannot account for stylized fact 1 about contributions.
MPCR implication. Proposition 1 implies that, for any given n, the value of MPCR (which is a) should have no e¤ect on contributions as long as there is at least one individual with i < 1 a and a 2 (
. 7 Yet the empirical evidence is di¤erent. As an example, take studies with n = 4 reported in Table 1 . Three studies with a = 0:5 report percentages of positive contributors varying from twenty-seven percent to fourty-four percent whereas two studies with a = 0:3 report percentages varying from twenty-…ve percent to thirty-one percent. Note that in case of n = 4; the range of a for which no e¤ect is predicted is a 2 (0:25; 0:67]; and since the above a values of 0:3 and 0:5 are within that range, the inequity aversion model cannot account for the change in contributions with MPCR when n = 4. A similar result holds for n = 5 data. We conclude that the inequity aversion model cannot account for stylized fact 2 about MPCR.
Group Size implication. Now with respect to the group size, Proposition 1 says that for any given a there should be no e¤ect if n 1 + 2=a; provided there is at least one individual with i < 1 a. 8 Consider the studies with a = 0:5 and n = 4 or n = 5 reported in Table 1 
The egocentric other-regarding preferences model
The The egocentric other-regarding preferences model is based on the assumption that agent i has preferences over her own payo¤ y i and n 1 others' payo¤s y j , j 6 = i; that can be represented by constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility functions. For the special case n = 2; otherregarding preference parameter 1 , and elasticity coe¢ cient 1 strictly between 0 and 1, the utility function for agent 1 can be written as In general, egocentric other-regarding preferences can be represented by the family of utility functions:
In the special case in which = 0, the CES preferences are Cobb-Douglas, as shown on the second line of statement (5). 9 Given that i > 0, utility function u i (y) has the classical regularity properties of strict convexity and strict positive monotonicity for all (positive, zero, and negative) values of the convexity parameter i such that i < 1. In summary, egocentrity, strict positive monotonicity, and strict convexity imply the parameter restrictions i < 1 and 0 < i < 1; for all i:
The egocentric other-regarding preferences model has the following implications for the …nal
period of a voluntary contributions public good game. (A proof is in appendix A.2.)
Proposition 2 The egocentric other-regarding preferences model predicts outcomes for a linear public good experiment that depend on the rate of return a; the size of the group n and the individual preference parameters r and r ; as follows.
If r 1=a 1
n 1 for all individuals r then there are no asymmetric equilibria. In addition if the assumption is satis…ed with strict inequality for at least one individual then the unique Nash equilibrium is for all contributions to equal 0.
n 1 for all individuals r then there are no asymmetric equilibria. Furthermore if the condition is satis…ed with strict inequality for at least one individual then the unique Nash equilibrium is for all contributions to equal w. Proposition 2 has the following implications for the data patterns described in the stylized facts.
Contributions implication. In all of the studies reported in Table 1 , Table 1 include observations where all subjects contributed either 0 or w: This reveals that part 3 of the proposition is relevant. According to part 3, an individual's optimal contribution will be positive or zero, depending on the ratio (1=a 1)=(n 1) as well as the individual's other-regarding preference parameters i and i : The group of experiments reported in Table 1 shows substantial numbers of individuals making both positive and zero contributions, which is consistent with part 3 of the proposition. We conclude that the egocentric other-regarding preferences model can account for stylized fact 1 about contributions. Table 1 . The percentage of positive contributions for groups of size …ve increases from eleven percent in the study with a = 0:33 (row 10 in Table 1 ) to the average of …fty-two percent in studies with a = 0:5 (rows 1-3 in Table 1 ). Looking at the studies with group size four, we …nd a similar e¤ect of increasing a on the percentage of positive contributors, the average increases from twenty-eight to thirty-…ve. We conclude that the egocentric other-regarding preferences model can account for stylized fact 2 about MPCR.
MPCR implication. Everything else equal, if a increases then
Group Size implication. Everything else equal, if n increases then (1=a 1)=(n 1) decreases, and therefore the fraction of individuals with i > (1=a 1)=(n 1) may increase. If that happens then part 3 of Proposition 2 implies that there will be more individuals with positive contributions.
The same part of the proposition implies that there will be fewer individuals with (1=a + 1)
(1=a 1)=(n 1) who are predicted to contribute nothing to the public good. Thus the expected total e¤ect of a larger n is a higher percentage of positive contributions. In the studies with a = 0:5 reported in Table 1 , the percentage of positive contributions varies from forty-four percent to …fty-seven percent for studies with n = 5 whereas for the ones with n = 4 it varies from twenty-seven percent to forty-four percent. This is consistent with the egocentric other-regarding preferences model's predictions. We conclude that the egocentric other-regarding preferences model can account for stylized fact 3 about group size. is not rejected at conventional signi…cance levels (p-value = 0.15). We conclude that the egocentric other-regarding preferences model can account for stylized fact 4 about endowments.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Traditional microeconomic and game-theoretic models of self-regarding (or "economic man") preferences imply zero contributions by all subjects in the last round of …nitely-repeated voluntary contributions games. This is not observed, hence new theory is needed. We discuss the implications of two recent models of social preferences for voluntary contributions to a public good.
The egocentric other-regarding preferences model incorporates the classical preference properties of strict convexity and strict positive monotonicity. The inequity aversion model has neither of these regularity properties. The egocentric other-regarding preferences model is more successful in rationalizing data from public goods experiments than is the inequity aversion model.
The inequity aversion model (Fehr and Schmidt 1999) predicts contributions of 0 as a unique
Nash equilibrium for voluntary contributions in ordinary, one-stage public good experiments. In a large number of many-period experiments that we survey (see Table 1 ), …nal period contributions are positive for about thirty-eight percent of the subjects. Furthermore, the inequity aversion model has the same implications for these public good experiments as does the traditional self-regarding (or "economic man") model. We conclude that neither the economic man model nor the inequity aversion model can explain behavior in ordinary public goods experiments that is characterized by a high proportion of hetergenously-positive individual contributions. 10 Furthermore, the inequity aversion model cannot account for the other three stylized facts for data from linear public good experiments.
The egocentric other-regarding preferences model has both symmetric and asymmetric Nash equilibria. The asymmetric equilibria are consistent with typical data from linear public good experiments in which many subjects contribute zero and many make positive contributions that are less than their endowments. This model can account for the four stylized facts from linear public good experiments.
A APPENDIX
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Part 1. Consider any vector g with non-identical contributions. Let agent i be one of the individuals with the largest contribution in g. That is, there are no contributions larger than g i . Since the contributions are not identical, there exists at least one individual j with a smaller contribution than g i . These statements imply that agent i's utility is
Suppose that agent i deviates and o¤ers slightly less than g i , say he o¤ers g i where is such that g i is strictly greater than the second highest contribution in g. 
Straightforwardly, the di¤erence in utilities is
which is positive if (1 a) (n 1)
Hence a su¢ cient condition for agent i to be better o¤ in case of contributing g i is i < (1 a) (n 1)=(n 3) which is true by assumption.
It can be straightforwardly shown that similar result holds for n 3 Part 2. To start with, note that the vector of zero contributions, (0; :::; 0) is a Nash Equilibrium.
Indeed, in this case the utility of any agent is simply ! and any unilateral deviation from it, necessarily involving a strictly positive contribution, say g i = " > 0 results in i (g i ; 0) = w " + a" i " which is smaller than w: Now let g be a vector of identical positive contributions, g j = z > 0 for all j = 1:::n: The utility of some agent i is i (z; z) = w + (na 1)z whereas in case of investing less than z; say z ", " 2 (0; z]; agent i's utility becomes i (z "; z) = w z + " + a(nz "
This implies that if there is an agent with i < 1 a then he is better o¤ by contributing less than z and therefore g = (z; z; :::; z) is not a Nash equilibrium, so part 2.a is shown. On the other hand if i 1 a; for all i then the last equality implies that nobody is better o¤ by deviating down. Similarly, as for the vector of zero contributions, (0; :::; 0) it can be shown that deviating up cannot increase utility. This concludes the proof for part 2.b.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Let each agent be endowed with amount w of the private good that can be consumed or contributed as input in amount g j ; j = 1; 2; :::; n; to production of the public good. Let G g 1 + g 2 + : : : + g n denote the total contribution to the public good. Then the utility, i (g) of contribution pro…le
Utility function (6) is used to prove the following proposition.
Proof. Let g = (g 1 ; : : : ; g n ) be a vector of contributions to the public good. Consider some agent r. Di¤erentiating the utility function (6) of agent r if 6 = 0; with respect to her own contribution g r ; one …nds that the partial derivative is (a 1)y r 1 r + a r P j6 =r y r 1 j where y k = (w g k + aG) k 1 ; k 2 fj; rg: The sign of the partial derivative then is determined by
If = 0 for agent r; the sign of the agent's marginal utility is given by substituting = 0 in (7).
Part 1: r 1=a 1 n 1 ; for all r = 1; :::; n: We show …rst that there are no asymmetric equilibria, and then we show that if the inequality is strict for at least one agent then g = (0; 0; : : : ; 0) is the unique Nash equilibrium.
Let a vector of contributions g be given. Suppose that g is an asymmetric vector. Let some player i be one of the highest contributors. Hence n 1 imply that the sign of (7) at (g i ; g i ) is negative since F (g i ; g i ) < (n 1) i a=(1 a) 1 0: Therefore g cannot be an equilibrium.
Suppose that g is symmetric. Then for any given r one has n 1 will make zero contributions since for any positive contribution g j one has F (g j ; g j ) < 0; which follows from
A.3 Proof of the Endowment E¤ect
Proof. Let the initial endowment w be the same for all agents. We show that the amount of the initial endowment:
1. has no e¤ect on individual contributions as a percentage of the endowment;
2. has a positive e¤ect on the absolute contributions of individuals.
First note that
where = g=w and i = i if i 6 = 0 and i = 1 + (n 1)
Indeed, denoting G = P r=1::n g r one has
Next, statement (8) implies that, for a given positive w, i maximizes i (1; ) if and only if w i maximizes i (w; g); for i = 1; ::n: Hence, is an equilibrium vector of individual contributions when the initial endowment is 1 if and only if, for any given w; the vector of individual contributions g (w) = w is an equilibrium when the initial endowment is w: Thus, for any given equilibrium contributions g (!) at endowment ! there exist equilibrium contributions g (v) at endowment v such that
The last statement implies that the amount of the endowment: (1) has no e¤ect on contributions as a percentage of the endowment; and (2) has a positive e¤ect on the absolute contributions. 
. This implies Ledyard (1995, 44 ). 2 The "hard-nosed" game theory predictions that Ledyard discusses are ones derived from purely-sel…sh preferences.
3 "Warm-glow" altruism means that people give just for the event of giving. 4 For a discrete set of contributions, the upper bound is i (
) : (See footnote 11 in appendix A.1 for details.) 5 According to the distribution reported by Fehr and Schmidt, 60% of the population has < 0:5: Therefore in all groups of size 4 and larger, < 0:5 is expected to be true for at least two individuals. 6 The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of the hypothesis that all contributions are zero implies rejection of the hypothesis with p-value of 0.000. 7 If a 2 (
(1 a) 1 and therefore the if condition in Proposition 1 is satis…ed since i 1 for all i. If the feasible set of contributions is discrete (as it is in an experiment) then for the empirical distribution of i ( 0:6 for all i) as reported by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) , the range of a for which no e¤ect is expected is ( The proof is similar to that for n = 2 in Cox, Friedman, and Gjerstad (in press).
unit cost imposed on the punishee costs the punisher one unit. Nevertheless punishment of under-contributors is observed. Such punishing behavior can be explained by negative reciprocity but it cannot be explained by inequality aversion. 1 1 In case of a discrete choice set, and the only feasible contribution smaller than gi and larger than the second highest is the second highest, nothing changes in the proof as long as there are at least three di¤erent levels of contributions in g: If not then the condition becomes i < (1 a) (n 1)=(n 2). Referring to the parameter distribution reported by Fehr and Schmidt, i 0:6 for all i. It can be easily checked that (1 a) Table   2 in Andreoni (1988) , the …rst row (regular condition) of Table 2 in Andreoni (1995a), the third row (positive framing) of 
